Print — role-military-bhutanese-politics — BhutanWiki

The role of the military in Bhutanese politics is defined by the constitutional position of the Druk Gyalpo (King) as Supreme Commander in Chief of the armed forces, a structure that places the military under direct monarchical authority without independent civilian oversight. The Royal Bhutan Army (RBA), the Royal Bodyguard (RBG), and the Royal Bhutan Police (RBP) collectively constitute the security apparatus of the Kingdom of Bhutan. While Bhutan transitioned to a constitutional monarchy in 2008, the military remained outside the purview of the elected parliament, answering directly to the throne.^[1]

The military has been involved in several politically significant episodes, including the operations against southern Bhutanese during the 1990s crisis, the 2003 Operation All Clear against Indian insurgent camps, and the 2024 launch of the Gyalsung compulsory national service program. Despite Bhutan's small size and reputation as a peaceful country, the military's relationship to the monarchy and its role in internal security raise important questions about civil-military relations in the country's evolving democratic system.

Structure and Command

Under Article 28 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Bhutan (2008), the Druk Gyalpo serves as the Supreme Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and the Militia. This constitutional provision ensures that military authority is vested in the monarch rather than in the elected government. The current Supreme Commander in Chief is King Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck.^[1]

Day-to-day operational command of the RBA falls to the Chief Operations Officer, currently holding the rank of Lieutenant General. While the Minister of Defence (part of the elected government) is nominally responsible for military policy and administration, the minister's authority operates within the framework of the king's supreme command. Bhutan does not have a dedicated defense ministry as a standalone institution; military authority is integrated directly into the monarchical structure.^[1]

Bhutan does not have an air force or navy (the country is landlocked). India, under the terms of the 1949 Treaty of Friendship (revised in 2007), bears responsibility for aspects of Bhutan's external defense, including air defense. The Indian Military Training Team (IMTRAT) maintains a permanent training mission in Bhutan, and all RBA and Royal Bodyguard officers train at India's National Defence Academy in Pune and the Indian Military Academy in Dehradun.^[1]

Size and Spending

The RBA was established in the 1950s in response to the Chinese occupation of Tibet, with a conscription system and plans for a standing army of 2,500 soldiers introduced in 1958. Force levels grew to approximately 4,850 by 1968, 6,000 by 1990, and peaked at over 9,000 in 2007 before being reduced. Estimates of current total active-duty military personnel vary, with sources citing figures ranging from 8,000 to 16,000, depending on whether the Royal Bodyguard, militia reserves, and support units are included. Reserve forces are estimated at 40,000 to 60,000.^[1]

Bhutan's military expenditure has historically been modest in absolute terms. In 2001, military spending totaled approximately USD 9.3 million, representing about 1.9 percent of GDP. Exact current figures are difficult to verify, as Bhutan does not publish detailed defense budgets. The World Bank and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) maintain partial data, but comprehensive transparency is limited.^[2]

The Military and the 1990s Crisis

The Royal Bhutan Army played a direct role in the government's operations against the Lhotshampa population of southern Bhutan during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Following the implementation of the 1985 Citizenship Act and the 1988 census in the southern districts, which resulted in the denationalization of tens of thousands of ethnic Nepali-speaking Bhutanese, the RBA — alongside the Royal Bhutan Police — conducted operations described by the government as measures to "restore order" in the south.^[3]

These operations included village-by-village sweeps, arrests of suspected dissidents, destruction of homes, confiscation of property and identity documents, and the forced expulsion of families. Amnesty International documented cases of torture, extrajudicial detention, and other abuses by security forces during this period. The organization's 1992 and 1998 reports characterized the military operations as part of a systematic campaign against the Lhotshampa population. According to multiple sources, the military's presence in the south during this period was not merely peacekeeping but active enforcement of expulsion policies.^[3]

It has also been alleged that Indian insurgent groups — the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) — assisted the Bhutanese government during the expulsions and subsequently occupied land vacated by refugees. The exact nature of any coordination between the RBA and these groups during the 1990s remains poorly documented and is disputed.^[1]

Operation All Clear (2003)

Operation All Clear was the first formal military campaign conducted by the Royal Bhutan Army. By the mid-1990s, Indian separatist groups — ULFA, NDFB, and the Kamatapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) — had established approximately 30 training camps in Bhutan's dense southern jungles. The Bhutanese government became aware of their presence in 1996 and raised the issue repeatedly in the National Assembly from 1997 onward. Diplomatic efforts to persuade the militants to leave failed.^[4]

On December 15, 2003, after an ultimatum expired, King Jigme Singye Wangchuck personally led the RBA into battle — a highly unusual act for a reigning monarch. Approximately 6,000 RBA and Royal Bodyguard personnel attacked an estimated 3,000 militants across 30 camps. By January 3, 2004, all camps had been captured or destroyed. The operation resulted in 485 militants killed or captured, while the RBA suffered 11 killed and 35 wounded.^[4]

Operation All Clear was presented domestically and internationally as a defense of national sovereignty. The king's personal participation was framed as demonstrating his willingness to share the risks faced by his soldiers. The operation significantly strengthened the monarchy's domestic legitimacy and bolstered India-Bhutan relations. Some analysts noted, however, that the militant camps had been tolerated for years before action was taken, and that the timing served both Indian security interests and the Bhutanese monarchy's political agenda.^[5]

Civilian Oversight and Accountability

A defining feature of Bhutan's civil-military relations is the absence of meaningful independent civilian oversight of the military. While the 2008 Constitution established a parliamentary democracy, it simultaneously ensured that the armed forces remained under the king's direct command rather than under the authority of the elected government or parliament. The parliament does not hold public hearings on military matters, detailed defense budgets are not published for public scrutiny, and there is no parliamentary defense committee with investigative authority comparable to those in established democracies.^[6]

There has been no formal inquiry or accountability process regarding the military's role in the 1990s operations against southern Bhutanese. No member of the security forces has been prosecuted for abuses documented by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, or the U.S. State Department during that period.^[7]

Gyalsung: Compulsory National Service

In December 2019, King Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck announced the Gyalsung program, a compulsory one-year national service requirement for all Bhutanese citizens upon turning 18. The Gyalsung Act was passed by Parliament on November 11, 2022, and the program commenced in September 2024 with the first cohort of approximately 13,000 youth born in 2005.^[8]

The program consists of three months of basic military training followed by nine months of specialized training in fields such as agriculture, entrepreneurship, computing, and health sciences. Participation is mandatory for all eligible Bhutanese regardless of their residence; evasion or desertion constitutes a fourth-degree felony under the Penal Code. Limited exemptions exist for monastic students and those deemed medically unfit.^[9]

Supporters describe Gyalsung as a nation-building exercise that instills discipline, skills, and national unity. Critics — primarily exile commentators — have drawn comparisons to compulsory labor systems and have questioned whether the program is partly designed to stem youth emigration by delaying the departure of young people during a critical year. The Bhutan News Network characterized it as a return of "compulsory free labour" to Bhutan.^[10]

The Role of the Military in Bhutanese Politics